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BELLING THE CAT: IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROSPECTIVE 
PAYMENT REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM FOR CRITICAL ACCESS 
HOSPITALS, ITS LIKELY SUCCESS, AND POLITICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS POLICY MOVE 
Health care is plagued by inefficient reimbursement policies which encourage 
expensive financial waste with little incentive to maintain care quality. Though 
no perfect solution exists, effective remedies may require a hard look at 
programs so far untouched by policy changes. This article discusses the 
application of a prospective payment system of reimbursement for critical 
access hospitals, as well as how this policy change would affect rural health 
care access, costs, and quality of care. Though some fear prospective payment 
systems of reimbursement would cripple rural health care, evidence shows it 
would likely promote more cost-efficient care without diminishing quality or 
outcomes. Further, there are a number of steps critical access hospitals may 
take to ensure survival and profitability, and in considering the need for more 
responsible health care spending, such a change may eventually prove 
necessary. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A notable fable1 depicts a council of mice congregating secretly to discuss 
measures they could take to outwit their longstanding enemy—the household 
cat—which had the frightening propensity of silently sneaking up on the mice, 
remaining undetected until it had captured its unwary victims. Many potential 
remedies were discussed; however, one mouse brilliantly ventured that the 
problem might be solved by using a ribbon to attach a small bell to the cat’s 
neck, providing warning to the mice when the cat approached. Amid the 
congregation’s applause upon hearing this plan, an old mouse stood and 
remarked, “That is all very well, but who is to bell the [c]at?”2 
For policymakers, changes in provider reimbursements often echo the old 
mouse’s concerns––though necessary, no policymaker wishes to be the first to 
“bell the cat” that might swallow his or her political career. With the federal 
health care budget soaring at unprecedented levels, policymakers have 
gradually shifted health care providers from systems of reasonable cost 
reimbursement (RCR) to a prospective payment system (PPS). These efforts 
have aimed to curb health care costs and encourage providers to offer more 
efficient, cost-effective care. However, for financial and political reasons, 
critical access hospitals (CAHs) have escaped this political migration. Though 
evidence demonstrates a move would likely be successful in creating a more 
efficient, cost-effective rural health system, many providers claim a change to 
PPS would leave America’s most vulnerable rural populations with no access 
to care.3 This concern is valid. However, this article demonstrates that it is not 
insurmountable and that the rural health care system, in the long run, would 
likely benefit from such a change. 
This article analyzes the proposal to shift CAHs to PPS reimbursement, as 
well as the practical and political effects of such a switch on rural health care 
provision. First, Section II outlines the history of the PPS reimbursement, the 
CAH exception to this system, and why this exception was created. Section III 
examines the proposed move of CAHs to PPS reimbursement, the fears and 
risks accompanying the policy proposal, and how such a switch would affect 
CAHs based on evidentiary studies. Finally, Section IV discusses the very real 
challenges of a move to PPS for CAHs and how these should be addressed by 
policymakers and health care providers to ensure not only survival but also 
financial viability and enhanced quality of care. Ultimately, this article 
demonstrates that a switch to PPS would not prove the crippling blow to CAHs 
 
 1. Aesop, Aesop’s Fables, Retold by Joseph Jacobs, in HARVARD CLASSICS (Charles W. 
Eliot & Joseph Jacobs eds., 1909), http://www.bartleby.com/17/1/67.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Michelle M. Casey et al., Minimum-Distance Requirements Could Harm High-
Performing Critical-Access Hospitals and Rural Communities, 34 HEALTH AFF. 627, 633 (2015). 
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as predicted; CAHs would not only survive, but would adapt to provide more 
cost-effective, quality care. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE CAH SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
In the battles for policy change, rural health care has historically escaped 
the brutal fray of budget cuts, enhanced conditions of participation, 
reimbursement rate reductions, practice regulations, and staffing 
requirements.4 This is particularly true for more vulnerable hospitals such as 
CAHs, which traditionally maintain thin financial margins,5 bear heavier 
percentages of low-income individuals and sicker populations,6 and lack the 
ability to shift losses to privately covered individuals.7 Additionally, rural 
populations are much less likely to have health insurance.8 Though the 
majority of American hospitals receive PPS reimbursement,9 it has long been 
recognized that rural hospitals provide access to health care for some of 
America’s most vulnerable populations, and thus policy has tended to favor 
their survival through generous reimbursement policies.10 To understand how a 
switch to PPS reimbursement would affect CAHs and their care provision, it is 
important to provide some background context on CAHs and PPS 
reimbursement. 
A. CAHs and Their Role in Rural Health Care Delivery 
CAHs were created as a measure to counteract a series of rural hospital 
closures, which sparked concerns that legislative action was needed to reduce 
the financial vulnerability of these hospitals and ultimately to save rural health 
 
 4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(S)(ii)(III) (2012) (showing that recent across-the-
board payment reductions for outpatient hospital services were held inapplicable to community 
hospitals and critical access hospitals). See also generally Act of Dec. 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
210, 91 Stat. 1485 (Medicare-certified Rural Health Clinics (RHCs)). 
 5. See NAT’L RURAL HEALTH RESOURCE CTR., CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL 2012 
FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT 6 (2012), https://www.ruralcenter.org/tasc/resources/critical-
access-hospital-2012-financial-leadership-summit-summary. Compare these margins with total 
aggregate hospital profit margins, which generally remain above four percent. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, 
TRENDWATCH CHARTBOOK 2016: TRENDS IN HOSPITAL FINANCING tbl. 4.1 (Sept. 1, 2016), 
http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/chartbook/2016/chapter4.pdf. 
 6. Jin Young Choi, A Portrait of Rural Health in America, 27 J. RURAL SOC. SCI. 1, 2 
(2012). 
 7. Id. at 4. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.20 to .30 (2015). 
 10. See 42 C.F.R. § 419.20(b)(2) (2015) (“Critical access hospitals (CAHs) are excluded 
from the hospital outpatient prospective payment system.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
326 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 10:323 
care from collapse.11 In an attempt to salvage the rural health care system, 
Congress enacted legislation as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that 
allowed states to designate certain rural hospitals as CAHs.12 Under CAH 
designation, hospitals receive more favorable Medicare reimbursement 
rates13—they are reimbursed at 101% of all reasonable costs14 “for outpatient, 
inpatient, laboratory and therapy services, as well as post-acute care in . . . 
hospital[] swing beds.”15 Unlike traditional PPS, these costs are not based on 
the type or number of services provided.16 
Hospitals must meet and maintain compliance with certain legal criteria to 
gain CAH status.17 Among these, a hospital must: (1) be a nonprofit or public 
hospital located in a rural county or more than a thirty-five mile drive (or a 
fifteen mile mountainous drive) away from another hospital;18 (2) maintain 
twenty-four hour emergency care services;19 (3) have no more than twenty-five 
acute care inpatient beds, for which each individual stay is not to exceed a 
period of ninety-six hours (unless exempted or waived);20 and (4) meet staffing 
 
 11. Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs), RURAL HEALTH INFO. HUB, https://www.ruralhealth 
info.org/topics/critical-access-hospitals (last modified Apr. 8, 2015) [hereinafter RURAL 
HEALTH]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ICN 006400, RURAL HEALTH 
SERIES: CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL (Feb. 2016). 
 14. “Reasonable cost,” in part, is defined as follows: 
  The reasonable cost of any services shall be the cost actually incurred, excluding 
therefrom any part of incurred cost found to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of 
needed health services, and shall be determined in accordance with regulations 
establishing the method or methods to be used, and the items to be included, in 
determining such costs for various types or classes of institutions, agencies, and 
services . . . . Such regulations shall (i) take into account both direct and indirect costs of 
providers of services (excluding therefrom any such costs, including standby costs, which 
are determined in accordance with regulations to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery 
of services covered by the insurance programs established under this subchapter) in order 
that, under the methods of determining costs, the necessary costs of efficiently delivering 
covered services to individuals covered by the insurance programs established by this 
subchapter will not be borne by individuals not so covered, and the costs with respect to 
individuals not so covered will not be borne by such insurance programs. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (2012). The Secretary is given the discretion to define “reasonable 
cost” as well as the “items to be included” under such reasonable costs. Id. 
 15. MEDPAC, CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS PAYMENT SYSTEM 1 (Oct. 2016). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Balanced Budget Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 105-133 § 4201, 111 Stat. 370. See also 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13; Critical Access Hospitals, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/provider-enrollment-and-certifi 
cation/certificationandcomplianc/cahs.html (last modified Apr. 9, 2013). 
 18. 42 C.F.R. § 485.610 (2011) (“Condition of participation: Status and location”). 
 19. 42 C.F.R. § 485.618 (2016) (“Emergency services”). 
 20. 42 C.F.R. § 485.620 (“Number of beds and length of stay”). 
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requirements for hospitals located in rural areas, with certain exceptions,21 as 
well as requirements for Medicare participation.22 The hospital must also 
currently participate in Medicare.23 
In addition to conditions of participation,24 conditions of payment also 
apply. These conditions of payment apply differently to inpatient and 
outpatient services. To receive payment for inpatient services, covered under 
Medicare Part A, a physician must provide a certification that includes: (1) an 
order in which the physician reasonably expects the patient to require a stay 
crossing two midnights, which involves medically necessary inpatient 
services;25 (2) the reason for inpatient services;26 (3) estimated time the patient 
will require in the hospital;27 (4) plans for post-hospital care (if necessary);28 
and (5) certification that the patient is reasonably expected to be discharged or 
transferred within ninety-six hours of admission.29 
For outpatient services, CAHs may be paid under one of two methods. 
Under the Standard Payment Method, a CAH receives 101% of reasonable 
costs for CAH outpatient facility services.30 If the CAH chooses to opt out of 
the Standard Payment Method, it may choose reimbursement under the 
Optional Payment Method, which permits reimbursement of reasonable costs 
 
 21. 42 C.F.R. § 485.631 (“Staffing and staff responsibilities”). 
 22. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 370 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. 1395i-4 (2010)); 42 C.F.R. § 485.601-647. 
 23. 42 C.F.R. § 485.635 (“Condition of participation: Provision of services”); 42 C.F.R. § 
485.612 (“Condition of Participation: Compliance with Hospital Requirements at the Time of 
Application”). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13. 
 24. In addition to the above-mentioned conditions of participation, other conditions of 
participation also apply. See 42 C.F.R. § 485.627 (dealing with the organizational structure and 
government of the CAH); 42 C.F.R. § 485.616 (noting the necessity of agreements with at least 
one other hospital in the case that the CAH is part of a rural health network); 42 C.F.R. § 485.641 
(describing quality assurance review); 42 C.F.R. § 485.638 (providing standards for maintaining 
clinical records); 42 C.F.R. § 485.639 (listing requirements regarding surgical safety); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 485.643 (providing requirements regarding tissue procurement protocols); 42 C.F.R. § 485.645 
(noting special requirements for CAHs providing long-term care services); and 42 C.F.R. § 
485.647 (describing special requirements for CAHs providing psychiatric and rehabilitation 
units). However, these conditions of participation are either requirements generally applied to 
hospitals (both CAH and non-CAH), or are not applied to all CAHs. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 
485.639, 485.643, 485.645, 485.647. 
 25. Fact Sheet: Two-Midnight Rule, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (July 1, 
2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-i 
tems/2015-07-01-2.html. 
 26. 42 C.F.R. § 424.13(a)(1) (2015). 
 27. Id. § 424.13(a)(2). 
 28. Id. § 424.13(a)(3). 
 29. 42 C.F.R. § 424.15(a) (2015). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
supra note 13, at 3. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1395m(g)(1) (2015). 
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of facility services plus 115% for professional services if the physician or 
practitioner has reassigned his or her billing rights to the CAH.31 
CAHs may also be reimbursed for ambulance transportation if the CAH is 
the sole provider or supplier of ambulance transports located within a thirty-
five mile drive of the CAH and, if there is no other provider or supplier of 
ambulance supports within a thirty-five mile drive, the CAH owns and 
operates an entity furnishing ambulance transports that is more than a thirty-
five mile drive from the CAH if that ambulance provider is the closest provider 
to the CAH.32 
Currently, there are 1,332 certified CAHs throughout the United States,33 
mostly concentrated in northern, rural states.34 Since the implementation of the 
Rural Hospital Flexibility Program, CAHs have fared with notable success, 
though they have generally maintained thinner margins than normally 
experienced by urban hospitals.35 Rural hospitals also face more challenges 
than their urban counterparts.36 Twenty-three percent of the population,37 or 
about 60,000,000 individuals,38 live in rural areas, and rural residents tend to 
be older,39 with more health problems,40 and lower incomes.41 Rural residents 
 
 31. Id. § 1395m(g)(2). 
 32. Id. § 1395m(l)(8). See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 
4. 
 33. RURAL HEALTH, supra note 11. 
 34. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE: LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS HAVE 
RESULTED IN PAYMENT ADJUSTMENTS FOR MOST HOSPITALS 24–26 (Apr. 2013) (noting that 
CAHs are predominantly located in the central states; in 2012, North Dakota and Montana had 
the largest percentage of hospitals designated as CAHs at eighty-four and seventy-nine percent, 
respectively). 
 35. THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON RURAL HEALTH, A TARGETED LOOK AT THE RURAL 
HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET 9–10, 19 (Apr. 2002), (explaining that rural hospitals are less able to 
balance financial losses by shifting costs to third-party payers, largely due to the significant 
number of uninsured patients rural hospitals typically cover). 
 36. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 1. 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. H.R. 3225, 116th Cong. (2015). 
 39. Currently, rural America is home to more than fifty-nine million people. Choi, supra 
note 6, at 1. Of these individuals, a disproportionate number are elderly. See M.K. Miller et al., 
Rural Populations and Their Health, in RURAL HEALTH SERVICES: A MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 3, 9–10 (Joyce E. Beaulieu & David E. Berry eds., 1994). “More than seventeen 
percent of rural individuals are sixty-five or older, versus thirteen percent of the total United 
States population.” Choi, supra note 6. 
 40. Choi, supra note 6 (noting that rural areas experience significantly greater health care 
needs than the general United States population, as rural residents tend to have much poorer 
health than urban residents. Chronic health conditions such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease 
are much more common, as well as obesity, mental illness, and disability). See also The 
Affordable Care Act – What It Means for Rural America, HHS.GOV (Sep. 30, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/fact-sheets/what-aca-means-for-rural-america/ 
index.html. 
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are also more likely to be uninsured42 or to receive coverage under Medicare 
and Medicaid.43 Because nearly sixty percent of gross revenues to rural 
hospitals come from Medicare and Medicaid, CAHs are also particularly 
sensitive to policy changes, especially regarding reimbursement rates.44 
Persistent physician shortages in rural areas only emphasize financial strains.45 
“Seventy-seven percent of rural counties . . . are designated as primary care 
health professional shortage areas while [nine] percent [of rural counties] have 
no physicians at all.”46 However, the CAH system has mitigated some of the 
unique struggles faced by rural providers. 
Though the CAH program has afforded many benefits to rural health 
systems in light of the unique challenges they face, the rising costs of rural 
health care, as well as the lack of incentives for providing cost-effective care 
under RCR, have raised persistent doubts about the CAH program’s 
effectiveness. These benefits and detriments are highlighted next. 
1. The Benefits of CAHs in Rural Health Care Provision 
The CAH system has undeniably benefited struggling rural hospitals. The 
most prominent benefit is financial. Not only has the 101% reimbursement rate 
 
 41. High uninsurance rates are exacerbated by the lower income levels typically found in 
rural areas; the average per capita rural income is $28,781 versus the $40,570 found in urban 
areas. See Choi, supra note 6. Rural counties also comprise eighty-one percent of counties 
designated as suffering persistent child poverty, and one-fourth of the nonelderly rural population 
has a family income below poverty level. Id. 
 42. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 2. See also Jon M. Bailey, The Top 10 Rural Issues 
for Health Care Reform, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF., Mar. 2009, at 1, 1 (individuals are less insured 
and thus more dependent on the insurance market); Jennifer Lenardson et al., Health Insurance 
Profile Indicates Need to Expand Coverage in Rural Areas, in RURAL HEALTH RES. & POL’Y 
CTRS., CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING HEALTH CARE ACCESS IN RURAL AMERICA 11, 11 (2009-
2010) (the rate of uninsured is as high as twenty-three percent, compared to the nineteen percent 
rate found in urban areas; these rates have not changed since 1997). 
 43. Choi, supra note 6, at 4. 
 44. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 4. 
 45. RURAL HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES vii (Thomas C. Ricketts, III ed., 1999) (showing 
that even though rural Americans comprise twenty percent of the nation’s population, only nine 
percent of physicians practice in rural areas. Additionally, rural patients tend to utilize physicians 
less frequently and consequently tend to have longer rates of hospital stays). Rural areas also face 
difficulties in attracting medical staff; physicians and other health professionals are retained at 
historically low rates. See Senator Craig Thomas, Understanding Rural Health Care Needs & 
Challenges: Why Access Matters to Rural Americans, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 257 (2006). 
Hospital vacancies for registered nurses, radiology technicians, and pharmacists are all greater 
than ten percent. Id. Moreover, one in seven hospitals face severe nursing shortages; more than 
twenty percent of nursing positions have not been filled. Id. One of the reasons for this difficulty 
in attracting medical staff is the isolation inherent in rural areas; this has been somewhat 
mitigated through the construction of rural health networks. Id. 
 46. H.R. 3225, 116th Cong. (2015). 
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afforded the ability to provide care in areas otherwise inaccessible to hospitals, 
higher reimbursement rates for telehealth services at CAHs have allowed even 
more extensive access to care for isolated and elderly rural residents.47 
Furthermore, CAHs receive reimbursement for 101% of the costs of training 
full-time equivalent residents in approved residency training programs at the 
CAH, which has allowed smaller hospitals to recruit and train vital health care 
professionals.48 Similarly, pass-through exemptions allow for CAHs to be paid 
at RCR rates for certified registered nurse anesthetist services, which give 
CAHs funds needed to attract these vital professionals to practice in designated 
health professional shortage areas (HPSAs).49 In certified HPSAs, physicians 
may receive a ten percent bonus payment for outpatient professional services 
furnished to a Medicare patient.50 Finally, CAHs may receive generous grants 
of up to $50,000 from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services51 for planning and implementing rural health care plans,52 
establishing or expanding rural emergency health services,53 or technologically 
upgrading various hospital systems.54 These financial benefits have provided 
enormous aid to smaller, geographically isolated hospitals.55 
Furthermore, CAHs have successfully invested these financial benefits 
back into their communities56 by contributing significantly to local economic 
sustainability. For example, one city in Kentucky demonstrated the pronounced 
success of the CAH system by examining the difference in impact on the local 
community both before and after the conversion of local hospitals to CAH 
status.57 Investments poured into funding local CAHs, which ultimately 
exhibited successful rates of return between 1.20 and 1.55 times for total local 
industry output, 1.23 to 1.64 times for employment levels, and 1.12 to 1.48 
times for income levels.58 Accordingly, the rate of return on an investment in 
 
 47. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 6 (noting that Medicare is 
to reimburse designated providers for eighty percent of the costs of telehealth services utilized). 
See also generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TELEHEALTH SERVICES 2 (2015). 
 48. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 2. 
 49. Id. at 7. See also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS MANUAL SYSTEM: 
PUB 100-04 MEDICARE CLAIMS PROCESSING: TRANSMITTAL 2719 (2013). 
 50. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 13, at 2. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(g)(3)(D) (2016). 
 52. Id. § 1395i-4(g)(1). 
 53. Id. § 1395i-4(g)(2). 
 54. Id. § 1395i-4(g)(3). 
 55. ILL. CRITICAL ACCESS HOSP. NETWORK, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE CRITICAL 
ACCESS HOSPITAL PROGRAM ON ILLINOIS COMMUNITIES 9 (2006). 
 56. See Lucia Ona & Alison Davis, Economic Impact of the Critical Access Hospital 
Program on Kentucky’s Communities, 27 J. RURAL HEALTH 21, 22–23 (2011). 
 57. Id. at 25. 
 58. Id. 
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converting hospitals to CAHs greatly exceeded its costs.59 These benefits 
extended statewide, as the new CAH system created approximately 6,410 jobs, 
along with $668.9 million in revenues.60 
Finally, in the face of physician shortages in rural areas, CAH status makes 
higher levels of staffing in rural hospitals more affordable, thus helping to 
alleviate physician shortages and to allow for more patients to access medical 
care than customarily available in rural areas.61 CAHs also demonstrate a level 
of care at least as good as other rural hospitals, with high ratings for quality of 
care, culture of safety, and work environment, and their nursing staff tend to 
have more experience than other rural hospitals.62 
However, even in consideration of the benefits, a number of detriments to 
CAH policy remain. Not only is the CAH program cost ineffective, but also it 
may have parted from its original purpose in a way that will be self-defeating if 
no policy changes are made. 
2. The Detriments of CAH Designation 
The detriments brought about by the CAH designation, like the benefits, 
are significant. History has shown that RCR promotes more inefficient 
behavior and less responsibility in cost management by providers.63 
Furthermore, the CAH program as enacted today no longer corresponds with 
the original intentions of the program originally designed by Congress, 
exacerbating the problems of inefficiency and cost management. 
RCR has played a large role in promoting higher levels of inefficiency and 
less responsibility in managing costs. When determining reimbursement 
mechanisms for health care providers, Congress “believed that payment 
mechanisms should (1) increase efficiency, (2) preserve financial viability of 
efficient providers, (3) support access to high-quality care, and (4) make 
 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. ILL. CRITICAL ACCESS HOSP. NETWORK, supra note 55, at 19. See also and compare 42 
C.F.R. § 485.604 (2014) (adding clinical nurse specialists as qualified staff to perform clinical 
services at CAHs under the law), with Personnel Qualifications, 77 Fed. Reg. 29060 (May 16, 
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 485.604) (noting that the Conditions of Participation for 
CAHs were revised to allow clinical nurse specialists to practice at CAHs). 
 62. Marianne Baernholdt et al., A Comparison of Quality of Care in Critical Access 
Hospitals and Other Rural Hospitals, 14 ONLINE J. RURAL NURSING AND HEALTH CARE 3, 15, 
19, 21 (2014), http://rnojournal.binghamton.edu/index.php/RNO/article/view/328. 
 63. Iustin Cristian Nedelea & James Matthew Fannin, Impact of Conversion to Critical 
Access Hospital Status on Hospital Efficiency, 47 SOCIO-ECON. PLAN. SCI. 258, 264 (2013). See 
also Michael D. Rosko & Ryan L. Mutter, Inefficiency Differences Between Critical Access 
Hospitals and Prospectively Paid Rural Hospitals, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 95, 118 
(2010) (noting that CAHs tend toward inefficiency because they do not suffer the same financial 
losses for high costs that are faced by non-CAHs under PPS reimbursement; when costs increase, 
CAHs are simply paid more). 
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equitable payments.”64 Congress felt PPS did not encourage hospitals to meet 
the second and third criteria, and it endeavored to structure the CAH payment 
system to promote efficiency and quality care.65 However, the implementation 
of CAHs may have worked against the best of intentions. Once hospitals 
converted to CAH status, they tended to become less efficient in managing 
costs and allocating resources.66 For some hospitals, cost inefficiency 
increased as much as 21.85%.67 
Such inefficiencies drive up per-visit health care costs. For example, when 
given the choice of two comparable treatments, the cost-efficient doctor will 
choose the less costly of the two if the treatments are expected to have similar 
outcomes.68 However, in a cost-inefficient system, doctors will have no 
incentive to choose the less costly method and will often choose the more 
expensive of the two––a tendency that is exaggerated when the costs are fully 
 
 64. Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 119. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Nedelea & Fannin, supra note 63, at 259 (showing that here, technical efficiency 
reflected “the relationship between inputs used (i.e., capital and labor) and outputs produced (i.e., 
outpatient visits, inpatient days, surgeries, etc.). Allocative efficiency reflect[ed] the ability of a 
hospital to produce a given level of outputs using the optimal combination of inputs (i.e., cost-
minimizing), given input prices. A hospital [was considered] (overall) cost efficient when it [was] 
both technically and allocatively efficient . . . indicat[ing] the extent to which the hospital 
minimize[d] the cost of producing a specific level of outputs, given input prices.”). See also 
Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63. The authors took into consideration that this inefficiency could 
have been “a reflection of more cost-inefficient hospitals choosing to convert to CAH status.” 
However, this inefficiency held even when the studied CAHs were compared to their pre-CAH 
performance. Id. Furthermore, these comparisons still showed an increase in inefficiency over 
time as CAHs participated in cost-based reimbursement. See id. Conversely, it is significant to 
note that there was a negative, i.e., inverse relationship, between PPS reimbursement and 
efficiency, suggesting that non-CAH hospitals participating in PPS reimbursement were 
incentivized financially to achieve higher levels of cost efficiency. Id. See also Shriniwas Gautam 
et al., Measuring the Performance of Critical Access Hospitals in Missouri Using Data 
Envelopment Analysis, 29 J. RURAL HEALTH 150, 156 (2013). Finally, it must be noted that 
inefficiency is an amorphous concept and difficult to both define and measure. See ACADEMY 
HEALTH, EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? HOW IS IT MEASURED? HOW 
CAN IT BE USED FOR VALUE-BASED PURCHASING? 2–3 (2006). 
 67. Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 115 (stating that hospitals that had participated in the 
CAH program for one year had a mean cost inefficiency of 13.33%, which increased each year 
until the seventh year—when the maximum recorded inefficiency was 21.85%—and then 
declined slightly to a mean of 20.24%). 
 68. GARY ROBBINS ET AL., NAT’L COMM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, NCPA POL’Y REP. NO. 
182, INEFFICIENCIES IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: WHAT CAN WE DO? 1 (April 1994). Such 
inefficiencies arise, in part, because of our dependence on third parties to pay the medical bill, 
which encourages overuse, as well as the fact that third-party reimbursement may provide less 
coverage for lower-cost treatment options, distorting prices in a way that make the costlier option 
appear more affordable to the patient. Id. at 1–3. 
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covered, as in an RCR system.69 In such systems, doctors have no incentive to 
consider the additional cost of using a more expensive product or of utilizing 
expensive inpatient hospital stays rather than outpatient facilities, raising 
health care costs both for the patient and the third-party payer.70 Consequently, 
cost-based reimbursement has served as a driver for escalating health care 
costs,71 and history shows that the CAH program has not been a valuable 
program in terms of promoting cost-efficiency.72 Competition among CAHs 
only exacerbates these inefficiencies,73 and with the high level of 
competition74 currently facing CAHs, there may be more room for efficiency 
improvement than presently indicated by CAHs’ thin financial margins.75 
In addition to the unnecessarily costly practices exhibited by CAHs, these 
hospitals may have also drifted from their original design to the point where 
many CAH-designated hospitals no longer fulfill their purpose as intended. 
The CAH certification program was originally created to ensure that 
vulnerable rural beneficiaries could obtain access to health care services.76 To 
ensure that it fulfilled this purpose and did not extend beyond the services 
required by these vulnerable populations, the thirty-five mile rule was created, 
 
 69. Id. at 1. 
 70. Id. at 4. 
 71. Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755/. 
 72. I. Cristian Nedelea and J. Matthew Fannin, Analyzing Cost Efficiency of Critical Access 
Hospitals, 35 J.P. MODELING 183, 193 (2013). See also Asa B. Wilson et al., Financial 
Performance Monitoring of the Technical Efficiency of Critical Access Hospitals: A Data 
Envelopment Analysis and Logistic Regression Modeling Approach, 57 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 
200, 206 (2012) (noting that only eighteen of 183 studied CAHs were operating efficiently). See 
also generally Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63 (concluding that inefficiency increased as length of 
participation in the CAH program continued). 
 73. See Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 95, 114 (noting that price-based competition 
tends to lower cost inefficiency). Though this is true for most health care organizations, which 
under the Affordable Care Act rely on cost-efficiency to sustain profit margins, RCR tends to 
increase inefficiency in CAHs by minimizing the incentives to reduce costs that comes with price 
competition. See I. Cristian Nedelea et al., Selected Paper Presentation at the S. Agric. Econ. 
Ass’n Annual Meeting: Cost Efficiency of Critical Access Hospitals 3 (2010). When cost is not 
an issue, hospitals tend to engage in service-based competition rather than price-based 
competition; such hospitals in more competitive settings employ costlier capital and equipment, 
incurring higher costs. Id. at 16–17. CAH competition, due to the receipt of cost-based 
reimbursement, mimics service-based competition rather than the more cost-efficient price-based 
competition. Id. 
 74. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MOST 
CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS WOULD NOT MEET THE LOCATION REQUIREMENTS IF REQUIRED 
TO RE-ENROLL IN MEDICARE (Aug. 2013) (concluding that a great number of CAHs would not 
meet the distance requirement if required to re-enroll, and therefore, face high levels of 
competition with nearby CAHs). 
 75. Wilson et al., supra note 72, at 209–10. 
 76. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 1. 
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requiring that each CAH be located not less than thirty-five miles from the 
nearest hospital.77 However, from 1997 until 2006, Congress permitted a 
waiver of this distance requirement for hospitals deemed medically necessary 
to local populations.78 This waiver of the rule led to an explosion of CAHs,79 
creating competition detrimental to CAH functioning. Today, CAHs represent 
approximately twenty-five percent of acute care hospitals in the United 
States.80 This competition has led to financial struggles as CAHs have 
struggled to maintain sufficient patient flow and adequate payer mix81 to cover 
their costs. Furthermore, the large number of CAHs has led to a rural health 
care environment more focused on competition to bring in sufficient patients 
rather than the provision of care intended—a wasteful focus when cost-
efficiency has become the presumption in federal reimbursement policies. 
Such cost inefficiencies and the failure to adhere to the original purpose of 
the CAH designation have led Congress to reconsider PPS reimbursement as 
an option for CAHs.82 These considerations have been heightened by 
unsustainable rises in health care costs, as well as requests for budget cuts for 
Medicare reimbursement programs.83 The predominant fear of switching 
CAHs to a prospective payment method of reimbursement is that the CAHs 
would not survive this switch, leaving the most vulnerable populations in 
America with no access to health care.84 This next section explores the benefits 
and challenges of switching to a PPS for CAHs, as well as the difficulties that 
would arise politically should such a system be proposed and the potential 
solutions for addressing these difficulties. 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 3. 
 79. Id. 
 80. RURAL POL’Y RESEARCH INST. HEALTH PANEL, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. VALUE-BASED PURCHASING PROGRAM AND CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS 2 (Jan. 2009). 
 81. See generally GA. STATE OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH, CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL 
FINANCIAL ANALYSES – 2009 3 (June 2010). This situation exemplifies the struggles CAHs face 
when located too close to commercial health care organizations; here, the commercial 
organizations tend to attract privately insured patients, while the remainder of the population—
usually containing a higher proportion of uninsured—tends to utilize CAH services. Id. 
 82. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND 
REVENUE OPTIONS 53 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter REDUCING THE DEFICIT]. See also generally 
NAT’L HEALTH ADVISORY COMM. ON RURAL HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., IMPLICATIONS OF 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO RURAL HOSPITAL PAYMENT DESIGNATIONS (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter 
NAT’L HEALTH ADVISORY COMM.]. 
 83. AHA SECTION FOR SMALL OR RURAL HOSPS., CAH UPDATE 1–3 (2015). 
 84. NAT’L HEALTH ADVISORY COMM., supra note 82, at 2; REDUCING THE DEFICIT, supra 
note 82. 
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III.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PPS REIMBURSEMENT, THE CAH EXEMPTION, AND 
THE OVER-DEPENDENCY OF CAHS ON RCR 
CAHs were created as an exception to traditional PPS reimbursement in 
order to provide rural services to more vulnerable, isolated rural populations. 
However, as a result of the cost inefficiency and counterproductive competitive 
practices, Congress has begun to reconsider CAH reimbursement for the 
majority of existing CAHs.85 In addition to a switch to PPS reimbursement, 
policy recommendations have included implementing a modified value-based 
purchasing system among CAHs as an incentive to improve performance,86 
lifting exemptions previously given that waived the thirty-five mile distance 
requirement for certain rural hospitals,87 and changing CAHs from RCR to a 
PPS method of reimbursement.88 
Though the exceptional treatment of CAHs under the law has permitted 
health care access to extend throughout rural America, as demonstrated in 
Section II, the CAH system has presented a number of detriments as well.89 
Not only have CAHs become overly dependent on RCR rates, leading to cost 
and resource allocation inefficiencies, but their operations have also drifted 
from their original purpose as designed by Congress––to provide hospital 
access to rural populations who would not otherwise have access to health 
care. These detriments have led Congress to reconsider reimbursement 
methods for CAHs. 
PPS reimbursement compensates providers for expenses at predetermined, 
fixed amounts.90 Payment rates are based on the classification system of that 
service, such as diagnosis-related groups for inpatient hospital services or case-
mix groups for inpatient rehabilitation hospitals.91 
 
 85. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 7. 
 86. RURAL POL’Y RESEARCH INST. HEALTH PANEL, supra note 80, at 2–3, 7; NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM. ON RURAL HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VALUE-BASED PURCHASING 
DEMONSTRATIONS FOR CRITICAL ACCESS AND SMALL PPS HOSPITALS 1 (Sept. 2011) 
[hereinafter VALUE-BASED PURCHASING]. 
 87. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 2; Joe Carlson, Proposal to Strip 
Critical-Access Status from Two-Thirds of Those Hospitals Called a Death Knell for Many, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE 2 (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130817/ 
MAGAZINE/308179942. 
 88. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 82. 
 89. See generally AM. HOSP. ASS’N, TRENDWATCH: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
FOR RURAL HOSPITALS IN AN ERA OF HEALTH REFORM (Apr. 2011). 
 90. Prospective Payment Systems – General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/prospmedi 
carefeesvcpmtgen/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 91. Id. See also Medicare Prospective Payment Systems, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING 
ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/practice/reimbursement/medicare/pps_sum.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2017). 
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PPS reimbursement applies to the majority of health care providers, with 
certain exceptions.92 Separate PPSs are used for different types of hospitals, 
such as acute inpatient hospitals, home health agencies, hospice, hospital 
outpatient, inpatient psychiatric facilities, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, 
long-term care hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities.93 Among other goals,94 
PPS aims to encourage effective, efficient care without overutilization of 
services by incentivizing managers to control the spending inefficiencies 
produced by unnecessary tests and treatment.95 Variations in PPS 
reimbursement rates per hospital type attempt to reflect actual variations in the 
costs of care between hospitals and services by reimbursing for factors 
considered beyond the hospital’s control and not related to the hospital’s level 
of efficiency, leaving health care organizations freer to strive for more efficient 
standards where improvement is possible.96 Additionally, payment rate 
adjustments are available for variances in labor expenses, costly outlier 
services, and rural areas where hospitals may experience more financial 
stress.97 These adjustments have been used to help smaller, more isolated 
hospitals.98 Payment rates, which are set by the Department of Health and 
 
 92. See Act of Dec. 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-210, 91 Stat. 1485 (showing that Medicare-
certified rural health clinics are excluded from PPS); see also 42 C.F.R. § 419.2 (2010) (noting 
services excluded from PPS); 42 C.F.R. § 412.23 (2011) (listing classifications of hospitals 
excluded from PPS, including certain psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, children’s 
hospitals, long-term care hospitals, cancer hospitals, and hospitals specially excluded—all of 
which must meet specific requirements to apply for and maintain exclusion from PPS 
reimbursement). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF EVALUATION & INSPECTIONS, MEDICARE 
HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: HOW DRG RATES ARE CALCULATED AND 
UPDATED 3 (2001) (noting that in creating the PPS for hospital systems, Congress had four goals: 
“(1) To ensure fair compensation for services rendered and not compromise access to hospital 
services, particularly for the more seriously ill; (2) To ensure that the process for updating 
payment rates would account for new medical technology, inflation, and other factors that affect 
the cost of providing care; (3) To monitor the quality of hospital services for Medicare 
beneficiaries; and (4) To provide a mechanism through which beneficiaries and hospitals could 
resolve problems with their treatment”). These goals were intended to transform the way hospitals 
thought about care delivery, because under the PPS system, the amount hospitals charged for 
reimbursement no longer mattered; payments were capped. Id. 
 95. AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, supra note 91. 
 96. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RURAL HOSPITALS AND MEDICARE’S PROSPECTIVE 
PAYMENT SYSTEM 11 (Dec. 1991). 
 97. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT PROSPECTIVE 
PAYMENT SYSTEM 5 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM]. Note also that 
different pay structures may be used for rural hospitals to ensure financial viability. Two 
examples of this are the sole community hospital and the Medicare-dependent hospital, which 
receive PPS reimbursement for all services except inpatient care. MEDPAC, supra note 15, at 4. 
Additionally, PPS rates for these hospitals are based on historical costs trended forward. Id. 
 98. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM, supra note 97. 
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Human Services and are disclosed to the health care organization at the 
beginning of the fiscal year,99 cover expenses for defined periods of time, such 
as per diem, per stay, or sixty-day episodes.100 
Congress enacted PPS reimbursement in 1983 as a response to soaring 
health care costs under the existing Medicare system, which, at that time, 
reimbursed hospitals on a generous retrospective cost basis.101 This system 
paid hospitals based on what the hospitals spent; however, the cost of care 
began to outpace inflation rates, and the full reimbursements under the existing 
retrospective payment system did little to incentivize efficiency or savings.102 
After enacting interim changes, Congress legislated the PPS under the Social 
Security Act of 1983. 
Though the PPS reduced reimbursement rates for the majority of health 
care providers, certain hospitals could apply for exemptions from the system 
based on economic and perceived societal needs, receiving RCR rates for 
provided services instead of the traditional PPS reimbursement.103 Hospitals 
exempt from PPS initially included a number of short-stay hospitals, 
psychiatric hospitals and units, rehabilitation hospitals and units, alcohol-drug 
hospitals and units, long-term care hospitals, and children’s hospitals.104 After 
a rash of hospitals in rural areas began to close their doors in the 1980s and 
1990s,105 this exception was extended to create a new designation of 
hospitals—CAHs. 
However, since the establishment of CAHs, RCR has proven a detriment to 
the system, and CAHs have become overly dependent on the high levels of 
reimbursement. This over-dependency has led to increased cost inefficiency 
and resource allocation, ultimately leading Congress to reconsider 
reimbursement rates for CAHs to counteract these tendencies. 
IV.  THE POLICY BATTLE: WOULD PPS REIMBURSEMENT OF CAHS 
DEVASTATE RURAL HEALTH CARE? 
Changes in reimbursement rates are never easy political moves, and 
switching CAHs to PPS reimbursement would likely present a struggle. This 
same political battle was exemplified in the original switch to a PPS in 1983 
and will be discussed next, along with the ramifications of the 1983 switch, 
and how CAHs would likely fare under the proposed PPS today. 
 
 99. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 94. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Stuart Guterman & Allen Dobson, Impact of the Medicare Prospective Payment System 
for Hospitals, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 97, 97 (1986). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 412.23 (2011). 
 104. Guterman & Dobson, supra note 101, at 100. 
 105. RURAL HEALTH, supra note 11. 
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A. The Challenges of Switching to PPS Reimbursement 
PPS reimbursement applies to most providers today, though it was not 
always this way. Originally, the vast majority of hospitals were reimbursed on 
a full or reasonable cost basis.106 Rising health care costs eventually led to 
reconsideration of such generous methods of reimbursement, and the first 
hospitals were moved to the PPS in 1983.107 These switches embroiled 
Congress and the health care system in a political tug-of-war for funding. On 
one side of the rope, Congress gestured towards ballooning health care costs 
and dug in its heels, refusing to spend more funds in ways it already felt were 
being wastefully used and hoping that payment reductions would incentivize 
more efficient use of hospital resources.108 On the other side, skeptical health 
care providers feared that an unviable balance would be struck, with too little 
reimbursement provided for services, and an over-abundance of faith in 
hospitals’ ability to compensate.109 Congress ultimately prevailed, and the 
aftermath revealed a previously unfound ingenuity among health care 
providers towards more efficient, quality health care services, as well as a 
decrease in overall health care spending.110 The reduction in funding 
encouraged ultimately better, more cost-effective care,111 and health care 
survived. Since this initial political skirmish, the majority of health care 
providers have been moved to PPS by Congress, with exceptions to this 
reimbursement system still carved out for hospital systems deemed particularly 
vulnerable, most notably, the majority of rural health care systems.112 Now, 
with most health care systems faring well on PPS reimbursement, even these 
traditional exemptions are no longer secure as Congress continues to eye the 
growing health care budget. 
The challenges of switching CAHs from RCR to PPS reimbursement are 
multi-faceted and are addressed here in two parts: first, the financial 
implications on the CAH system of a reduction in reimbursement rates and, 
second, how potential closures of CAHs might affect rural health outcomes. 
 
 106. Barnes, supra note 71. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 1395WW (2006). 
 108. Robert F. Coulam & Gary L. Gaumer, Medicare’s Prospective Payment System: A 
Critical Appraisal, (Supp. 1991) HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 45, 45. See also generally Guterman 
& Dobson, supra note 101. 
 109. Coulam & Gaumer, supra note 108. 
 110. Id. at 48. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See 42 C.F.R. § 412.96 (2016). 
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1. The Financial Implications of Reductions in Reimbursement Rates on 
CAHs 
Financial difficulties have long plagued rural hospitals. Though CAHs 
represent over sixty percent of rural hospitals, the variation in financial status 
between CAHs is significant.113 Due to their small size and generally remote 
location, CAH performance is particularly sensitive to changes in patient 
revenue.114 
For example, there is some evidence that rural hospitals are less able to 
cost-shift to private parties than urban hospitals.115 Many believe that 
compensation for government cutbacks occurs in the form of cost-shifting 
towards private payers.116 However, studies have shown that cost markups do 
not vary significantly with financial pressures—at least, not enough to offset 
costs generally.117 Rather, evidence shows that hospitals tend to take measures 
to reduce costs rather than cover their costs through markups.118 These actions 
include reducing personnel (resulting in smaller, more highly-skilled staff),119 
postponing pay increases, and limiting charity care.120 Evidence demonstrated 
initially successful results from cost-containment efforts in reducing length of 
stay; however, mixed results were demonstrated regarding increases in 
efficiency per patient stay.121 
In considering a switch to PPS reimbursement, it must also be noted that 
PPS reimbursement rates are designed to reflect variations in costs among 
hospitals resulting from factors beyond the hospital’s control and unrelated to 
efficiency; thus, CAHs would receive higher rates of reimbursement under a 
PPS than other hospitals might.122 The cost-related factors for which a CAH 
may receive additional reimbursement include types of medical conditions 
treated and local labor costs,123 as well as location, market forces, and costs of 
 
 113. George H. Pink et al., Variations in Financial Performance Among Peer Groups of 
Critical Access Hospitals, 23 J. RURAL HEALTH 299, 299 (2007). 
 114. Id. at 304. 
 115. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 89, at 4–5. 
 116. Jack Hadley & Judith Feder, Hospital Cost Shifting and Care for the Uninsured, 4 
HEALTH AFF. 67, 68 (1985). However, it must be noted that the evidence for cost-shifting is 
mixed; it is likely more research is necessary in this area before firm conclusions may be drawn. 
See Tamara Hayford & Lyle Nelson, CBO’s Analysis of Financial Pressures Facing Hospitals 
Identifies Need for Additional Research on Hospitals’ Productivity and Responses, 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51920. 
 117. Hadley & Feder, supra note 116. 
 118. Id. at 68–69. 
 119. Eileen Appelbaum & Cherlyn Skromme Granrose, Hospital Employment Under Revised 
Medicare Payment Schedules, 8 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 37, 44 (1986). 
 120. Hadley & Feder, supra note 116, at 75. See also Hayford & Nelson, supra note 116. 
 121. K. Davis et al., Is Cost Containment Working?, 4 HEALTH AFF. 81, 87 (1985). 
 122. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 11, 13. 
 123. Id. at 9. 
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providing health care.124 Moreover, rural hospitals are paid additional coverage 
for historical cost differences with unknown causes.125 Because of the unique 
financial difficulties and health care costs faced by CAHs in comparison with 
urban and non-CAH rural hospitals, CAHs would likely receive a higher PPS 
reimbursement rate than currently is provided to other hospitals. 
Still, even though evidence suggests that the CAH system could support a 
switch to PPS in the long-term, it is likely that a switch to a PPS would lead 
some CAHs to close in the short-term.126 Accordingly, the effects of potential 
CAH closures on rural health care systems is addressed next. 
2. The Effects of Potential CAH Closures on Rural Health Care 
Proposals to switch CAHs to PPS reimbursement have raised a number of 
fears about potential hospital closures and maintaining access to care for rural 
populations. Though a switch to PPS reimbursement for CAHs would lead to 
the closure of some CAHs,127 evidence suggests both that such closures would 
not, in fact, reduce access to quality health care for America’s most vulnerable 
rural populations128 and that a reduction in competition and the conversion 
from a RCR system to prospective payment would ultimately enhance 
efficiency and incentivize cost savings and without reducing quality of care.129 
First, a closure of some CAHs would not likely lead to a reduction in 
quality of care because not all CAHs may, in fact, be necessary for adequate 
care provision in rural areas.130 Initially, it was required that all CAHs be 
located no less than thirty-five miles from the nearest hospital or no less than 
fifteen miles in areas with mountainous terrain.131 However, from 1997 to 
2005, states could waive this requirement for hospitals designated as 
“necessary” health service providers.132 Following 2006, hospitals again had to 
meet the distance requirements; however, exemptions were given for those 
hospitals constructed during the 1997-2005 waiver period.133 Because of these 
 
 124. NAT’L RURAL HEALTH RES. CTR., CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITAL FINANCE 101 
MANUAL 8 (2012). 
 125. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 13. 
 126. Michelle M. Casey et al., Minimum-Distance Requirements Could Harm High-
Performing Critical-Access Hospitals And Rural Communities, 34 HEALTH AFF. 627, 631–32 
(2015). 
 127. Id. at 632–33. 
 128. Rosko & Mutter, supra note 63, at 122. 
 129. Id. 
 130. J. Matthew Fannin & I. Cristian Nedelea, Performance of the Critical Access Hospital 
Program: Lessons Learned for Future Rural Hospital Effectiveness in a Changing Health Policy 
Landscape, 28 CHOICES 1, 1 (2013). 
 131. Casey et al., supra note 126, at 627. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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exemptions granted, the number of CAHs exploded during the initial years.134 
Many of these “necessary provider” hospitals were constructed within the 
thirty-five mile proximity requirements. Currently, two-thirds of CAHs are 
within the thirty-five mile requirement and would not meet the requirements to 
retain critical access certification if required to re-enroll in Medicare.135 Of the 
846 CAHs that would not meet the distance requirement, 306 were located 
within fifteen miles of the nearest hospital.136 Of these, 235 were between ten 
and fourteen miles of the nearest hospital, while the other seventy-one were 
less than ten miles from the nearest hospital.137 
The close proximity of such a large number of CAHs has spurned 
competition between CAH hospitals, increasing financial struggles.138 In light 
of this, a reassessment of CAH criteria resulting in a switch to a PPS would not 
necessarily endanger rural health care. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) has already begun to consider whether to reassess the 
certification of these CAH hospitals––an act projected to save Medicare and its 
beneficiaries $449 million, even if only hospitals less than fifteen miles from 
each other were considered for reevaluation.139 Implementation of PPS 
reimbursement for these CAHs (or, as discussed by CMS, stripping these 
hospitals completely of CAH status) would lead to short-term high rates of 
closure due to a reduction in profit margins.140 However, these closures would 
occur primarily as a result of the underlying competition, exposed by a change 
in reimbursement rates.141 
A switch to PPS reimbursement, even just for the hospitals specifically 
addressed by CMS, would draw CAHs back into the boundaries of their 
original purpose as designed by Congress. Originally, the thirty-five mile 
distance requirement was calculated to balance the health care access of 
isolated rural populations with efficient federal budgeting: Congress desired to 
bring hospitals into areas that were considered financially unviable. However, 
to add more hospitals would introduce competition among providers in already 
 
 134. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 3–4. 
 135. Id. at 12. “Overall, 849 of the 1,329 CAHs (64 percent) would not meet the location 
requirements if required to re-enroll in Medicare. The vast majority of these CAHs would not 
meet the distance requirement, and only three of these CAHs would not meet the rural 
requirementFalseOf the 846 CAHs that would not meet the distance requirement . . . 306 were 
located a drive of 15 or fewer miles from their nearest hospitals or other CAHs. Of these CAHs, 
235 were between 10-14 miles from their nearest hospitals or other CAHs. The other 71 CAHs 
were less than a 10-mile drive from their nearest hospitals or other CAHs.” Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. GA. STATE OFFICE OF RURAL HEALTH, supra note 81. 
 139. See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 16. 
 140. Casey et al., supra note 126, at 633. 
 141. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 96, at 7–8. 
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sparsely populated areas and would reduce budgetary efficiency, while fewer 
hospitals would result in a lack of access to care.142 The thirty-five mile 
distance requirement was a compromise between the two. Nevertheless, 
hospitals took advantage of the system and began to request waivers of the 
distance requirement so they could still obtain CAH status.143 This CAH 
waiver was in effect until January 1, 2006 and allowed for CAHs to build at 
distances as close as ten miles from one another.144 As a result, nearly two-
thirds of CAHs today would not meet the thirty-five mile distance requirement. 
These findings are important. The close proximity of CAHs in sparsely-
populated areas has led to fierce competition in an effort to maintain open 
doors,145 which has led hospitals to spend money inefficiently or promote more 
costly procedures to their patients in an attempt to attract patients from the 
sparse surrounding populations.146 These sorts of competitive practices tend to 
raise the cost of health care, both for the patient and for the third-party 
payers.147 
Because CAHs in close proximity compete for the same small groups of 
patients, hospital closures resulting from competitive proximity between 
hospitals would not notably affect access to needed health care services.148 
One study examined forty-one rural hospitals that closed in 1989 and found 
that twenty-six were located twenty miles or less from another hospital, and 
only three were located thirty or more miles from another hospital.149 Though 
the closures may have reduced some access to physicians and emergency 
 
 142. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 74, at 19. 
 143. See Casey et al., supra note 126, at 627. 
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services, the study concluded that the closings did not affect overall care 
because alternative hospitals remained available to receive patients.150 
Further, even a high rate of closures would not likely change health care 
outcomes for these populations.151 During the original shifts to PPS 
reimbursement among some rural hospitals, which had originally received 
RCR,152 a string of rural hospitals began to close their doors for good.153 Yet, 
health outcomes and access to care remained largely unaffected by this new 
policy due to the fact that a majority of the hospital closures occurred as a 
result of surreptitiously fierce competition.154 This longstanding competition 
had been quietly cloaked by generous reimbursement policies that, once pulled 
back, revealed the underlying wasteful expenditures churned out by hospitals 
to attract the same scarce populations.155 
B. The Benefits of a Switch to a PPS for CAHs 
A switch to PPS reimbursement would likely encourage higher quality care 
and increased cost efficiency. As aptly stated by the National Rural Health 
Association, “[f]orm follows finance: regardless of the type system, providers 
will conform to ‘how the money flows’. Innovative models of care delivery 
and providers will be an outcome associated with changes in reimbursement 
practices.”156 Studies of the effects on previous hospitals of a switch from cost-
based reimbursement to a PPS support this conclusion. In the first year of PPS 
implementation in 1983, PPS-participating hospitals were able to significantly 
decrease the length of patient stays,157 an indicator often consulted as a 
measure of efficiency. Whereas the largest previous drop in length of stay had 
only been four percent, in 1984, length of stay dropped by nine percent.158 
With the implementation of the PPS, hospitals experienced significantly lower 
occupation rates, with an average occupation rate of 67.7% (down from 
73.7%).159 With repeated demonstrations of decreases in patient length of stay 
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as well as admissions,160 it is likely that CAHs would experience these same 
efficiency savings under PPS reimbursement. 
Additionally, PPS is intended to encourage collaboration,161 and 
reimbursement changes have been shown to facilitate improvement discussions 
within organizations, as well as to align these organizations to provide more 
patient-centered and proactive care, to leverage provider expertise to deliver 
more efficient care, and to improve the overall quality of care.162 These 
incentives are furthered by the current focus on programs such as value-based 
purchasing, which seeks to tie reimbursement funds to the quality of care 
produced by hospitals.163 Thus, a switch to PPS reimbursement would likely 
encourage greater collaboration and systemization among rural hospitals, 
facilitating financial viability and quality patient care. 
Finally, PPS has been shown to better hospital processes, including clinical 
documentation processes.164 One Dallas hospital began to find smarter ways to 
utilize the hospital’s electronic health records (EHR) to run patient reports; 
they also redesigned EHR templates to try to improve the quality of patient 
treatment information captured in notes and to improve note-taking efficiency 
by physicians.165 These endeavors, inspired by a switch to PPS reimbursement, 
encouraged successful changes to improve hospital process flow. Likewise, 
financial pressures under a PPS could incentivize CAHs to improve process 
flows and record-keeping procedures. 
In light of the benefits presented by a potential switch to PPS 
reimbursement, policymakers and providers must note that RCR is not 
necessarily the only, or the best, remedy to prevent CAH closure or to maintain 
access to rural health care.166 Under the current CAH system, RCR has served 
as only one method to provide a safety net for vulnerable hospitals. Evidence 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] BELLING THE CAT 345 
supports that it is not the best, or even the better, option to provide financial 
relief for struggling rural hospitals.167 A cost-benefit analysis taking into 
account the current inefficiencies of CAHs, as well as the benefits 
demonstrated by hospitals currently operating under PPS, points to PPS as a 
viable long-term solution for rural health care providers. Thus, political actors 
and stakeholders must not grasp too firmly at a familiar system that presents 
some benefits but, ultimately, may not be the better answer to rural health care 
provision. Though CAHs would likely face interim struggles during a switch to 
PPS reimbursement, they would ultimately overcome these challenges to 
survive long-term, and such changes would likely inspire more efficient, cost-
effective, quality care. 
IV.  RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES OF MOVING CAHS TO PPS 
REIMBURSEMENT 
Though evidence supports that CAHs would likely survive the interim 
difficulties they would face with a switch to PPS reimbursement, there are 
several actions that CAHs may take to help ensure their financial viability. 
The first actions to ensure the survival of rural hospitals deemed most 
critical would likely occur in the realm of policy. These policy solutions 
include a modified PPS reimbursement rate, legal redefinitions (and stricter 
enforcement) of distance requirements, easing of certain regulatory burdens, 
and state modification of laws governing health practitioners’ scope of 
practice. 
In response to a shift to PPS reimbursement, a modified reimbursement 
rate might assist in ensuring CAH survival. Regardless of potential benefits of 
a shift to PPS reimbursement, the fact remains that rural hospitals are less able 
to shift costs to private payers to account for cuts in reimbursement rates, as 
the majority of their patients tend to be publicly insured.168 This characteristic 
sets them apart from their urban counterparts, who are better able to shift costs 
when under financial strain. A tailored PPS reimbursement rate, where CAHs 
receive more compensation than is currently provided upon meeting certain 
criteria, though not to the extent of RCR, would help to ease strain due to cost-
shifting inabilities.169 Such modified reimbursement rates might avert potential 
financial hardship while also encouraging efficiency and cost-savings. This 
modified reimbursement rate might come in the form of a version of value-
based purchasing, which could provide the additional benefit of incentivizing 
quality and cost-efficiency—qualities historically difficult to promote under 
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traditional Medicare reimbursement.170 However, value-based purchasing 
methods would need to be adapted for the rural communities, as historically it 
has been difficult to translate these methods from urban providers to their rural 
market counterparts.171 
Second, legally redefining distance requirements for CAHs might alleviate 
the tension in some areas straining to provide care to more isolated rural 
residents. Though the thirty-five mile standard was originally established to 
provide a balance between access to care and unnecessary competition, some 
counties have still struggled to maintain accessible care for their communities 
under these requirements.172 In 2007, a bill was introduced in Congress to 
reduce the thirty-five mile requirement for CAHs to thirty miles; however, this 
bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Health after a few days and has not 
been brought up since.173 It is not likely to be addressed any time soon. 
However, this is one action that might be taken to enhance financial viability 
by “strik[ing] a [better] balance between convenient access to. . .care and 
unnecessary competition.”174 
Furthermore, financial solutions may still be available for CAHs who 
switch to PPS reimbursement. First, instead of simply shifting CAHs from one 
system of payment (RCR) to another (PPS), Congress could restructure CAHs 
to reflect the payment systems for sole community hospitals (SCHs) or 
Medicare-dependent hospitals (MDHs). These hospitals receive cost-based 
payments only for inpatient services and receive modified PPS reimbursements 
that are based on historical costs trended forward.175 This encourages cost-
savings, as reimbursements do not increase when costs increase.176 
Furthermore, the conditions of participation for SCHs and MDHs are similar to 
those already required of CAHs,177 facilitating a potential restructuring of 
CAHs to reflect one of these two systems. 
Another solution might come through the easing and restructuring of 
regulatory burdens on CAH operations and staffing. In 2012, Congress 
attempted to ease regulatory burdens on CAHs, thus permitting them to devote 
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resources to providing care to vulnerable populations.178 These provisions 
included increased flexibility in meeting conditions of participation for special 
reimbursement rates: for example, by broadening the concept of “medical 
staff” to allow smaller hospitals to include other practitioners as staff in 
accordance with state law;179 permitting podiatrists to participate in medical 
staff leadership;180 permitting self-administration of certain medications;181 
and eliminating requirements that CAHs furnish diagnostic, therapeutic, 
laboratory, radiology, and emergency procedures directly by CAH staff.182 
This rule reduced the total regulatory burden experienced by CAHs and similar 
hospitals by nearly five billion dollars over the next five years, with the 
greatest potential cost savings stemming from changes to the conditions of 
participation.183 These savings would likely permit greater flexibility in policy 
changes, alleviating some concerns about shortfalls in revenue. However, 
additional modifications could be made. For example, easing of federal 
licensure and certification processes might reduce operation costs and barriers 
to care.184 Under licensure and certification requirements, there is little room 
for rural hospitals to invest in innovative approaches to care, creating high 
health care costs for rural hospitals even though rural health care remains less 
expensive per beneficiary.185 Additionally, regulations could be restructured to 
support a more patient-centered focus appropriate to clusters of rural 
communities, allowing for prioritization of services tailored to community 
needs, rather than the current provider-centered focus that predominates.186 
Regulatory incentives, perhaps financial, to establish rural health care networks 
may also provide a vital component to ensuring CAH survival.187 
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Moreover, CAHs have demonstrated success in garnering additional 
revenue by diversifying medical procedures offered.188 This diversification 
may be necessary to offset shrinking patient visits and revenues.189 CAHs have 
already begun to diversify their revenue streams to bring in additional patient 
groups and to better adapt to local community needs.190 Local collaborative 
partnerships with larger hospitals have provided further opportunity for 
revenue stream diversification.191 This will become even more important as 
health care reform progresses, particularly in states that have expanded 
Medicaid programs and patient demand rises that may strain limited 
resources.192 Currently, CAHs most often offer services such as primary group 
practices, long-term care facilities, and specialty facilities such as orthopedic 
units, general surgical units, and oncology.193 Still, concerns such as financial 
risk, lack of specialists available to work full-time in more isolated areas, and 
competition between entities have made revenue stream diversification more 
difficult.194 These concerns have been somewhat mitigated by strategic 
partnerships; for example, in some cases, a third party such as a county will 
own the facilities, which are operated day-to-day by the CAHs.195 Such 
partnerships have allowed for the addition of services such as dental offices, 
community health centers, mental health practices, emergency medical 
services, and retail pharmacies, where it is in the interest of the CAH to offer 
such services.196 
In correspondence with procedure diversification, CAHs could improve 
their financial situation by following the national shift197 to a focus on 
preventive and primary care, rather than tertiary care. As noted by the National 
Rural Health Association: 
The broad goal of rural health advocates should be to improve the health of 
rural people. There is recognition that good health is determined by more than 
just access to acute health services. Prevention, health improvement strategies, 
and social determinants of health are profoundly important. Without 
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recognizing that the population segments are diverse and without addressing 
those conditions that drive disparities, realistic expectations and strategies for 
long-term improvement in health cannot be sufficiently defined, let alone 
achieved. Health related costs cannot be managed, let alone minimized.198 
With health care reform and the subsequent redesigning of health care 
delivery models, preventive care as a tool to promote population health and 
reduce health care costs is becoming more important.199 The ideal rural health 
care system—one that would maximize health care resources while minimizing 
costs—would promote and allow increased access to prevention and screening 
services that would prevent or delay the onset of the chronic diseases that so 
heavily burden rural communities.200 
Finally, shrewd cost-cutting and efficiency implementation processes may 
ease budget tensions in shifting to a PPS method of reimbursement. Health 
care administrators tend to launch into cost-cutting measures that seem 
intuitive but are, in reality, counterproductive, ultimately leading to higher 
costs and lower-quality care.201 Often, thin financial margins in health care 
organizations are a consequence not of insufficient reimbursement, but instead 
“are the result of mismatched capacity, fragmented delivery, suboptimal 
outcomes, and inefficient use of highly skilled clinical and technical staff.”202 
Ultimately, avoiding these common mistakes requires active collaboration in 
cost-measurement and management not just between administrators and 
suppliers, but also between administrators and clinicians.203 It may also require 
a realistic recognition that not all services currently provided to rural 
populations are necessary. The National Rural Health Association addresses 
this issue directly, asserting: 
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It is easy to say that rural residents should have ready access to all of the 
identified services and referral linkages to more specialized providers and 
facilities. However, in many cases neither the local capacity nor the referral 
resources and linkages are adequate. To state that all identified resources 
should just ‘be there’ is overly simplistic. This does not mean that we should 
lower our sights. It does mean that in rural areas, priority should be given to 
putting in place the identified building blocks and securing the resources 
necessary for their sustainability.204 
In an area of limited resources, it is vital to recognize these limitations 
when creating policy. Recognition of these limitations will ultimately aid in 
providing more cost-effective use of available resources and may play a key 
role in ensuring the survival of needed rural health care services. 
Each of these solutions provides a viable option to offset potential costs 
incurred by switching from RCR for CAHs to a PPS method of reimbursement. 
Still, the most daunting challenge to address would be a political one. The 
ramifications of switching CAHs to PPS reimbursement are positive in the 
long-term. However, in light of the short-term financial difficulties that will 
ensue, the question remains: who is to bell the cat? 
Aesop’s witty fable aptly shows that even the better ideas often propose an 
unconsidered but daunting challenge.205 Though, in reality, a switch to PPS 
reimbursement would likely benefit rural health care long-term, the painful 
short-term consequences make such a move a great idea in theory, but 
practically undesirable to enact. The challenges intimated by PPS 
reimbursement, though not impossible to overcome, bring with them the 
equally intimidating challenge as to who will dare face the opposition of many 
provider, patient, and physician groups to enact what might certainly be seen 
as an uncertain, if not devastating, remedy. Cuts to health care spending are 
notoriously difficult to implement and even more so for populations perceived 
as vulnerable, which are generally exempted from such cuts.206 
Providers will initially feel the blade of health care reimbursement cuts and 
will likely struggle under the pressure to provide quality services more cost-
efficiently––a prospect that has left policymakers and patients fearing they will 
be left without access to care. This fear of cutting health care funds is deeply 
interwoven with the perception that vulnerable populations will be left 
destitute and unviable. Unless and until these unsavory but exaggerated 
perceptions are addressed honestly by providers and fully confronted by 
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policymakers with the benefits of a switch demonstrated as fully as feasibly 
possible prior to implementation, such a conversion may be long in coming. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is not, and there will never be, a perfect remedy for the United States 
health care system; there are only better alternatives. Furthermore, with soaring 
health care costs, there remains a dire and growing need for greater 
responsibility in government management of taxpayer dollars to control 
spending and for hospitals to be held accountable to responsible spending. 
Ultimately, a switch to PPS for CAHs would not prove the crippling blow 
predicted. Not only would CAHs survive, but a PPS would also encourage 
more cost-efficient, quality care. However, it is not so easy to “bell the cat.” In 
considering a move to PPS reimbursement for CAHs, American policymakers 
must fully confront and address both the risks and fears involved in this policy 
move if America is to move forward with such a system. 
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